Life sentences with only possibility of release on parole after 40 years’ imprisonment are incompatible with the Convention
JUDGMENT
Bancsók and László Magyar (no. 2) v. Hungary 28.10.2021 (app. no. 52374/15 and 53364/15)
SUMMARY
The case concerned the imposition of life sentences with eligibility for release on parole only after
40 years of imprisonment.
The Court found that such sentences did not, in effect, offer any real prospect of release, and were
thus not compatible with the Convention.
PRINCIPAL FACTS
The applicants, József Bancsók and László Magyar, are Hungarian nationals who were born in 1979
and 1960 respectively. They are serving life sentences in prison in Hungary.
Mr Bancsók (application no. 52374/15) was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in June 2013,
with eligibility for release on parole once he had served 40 years in prison. After his sentence was
upheld on appeal in 2015, Mr Bancsók lodged a constitutional complaint. He argued that setting the
earliest date of his release once a term of 40 years had been served was contrary to the case-law of
the Court and constituted inhuman treatment. The proceedings are still pending.
Mr Magyar (application no. 53364/15) was sentenced to life imprisonment in September 2010,
without eligibility for parole, under articles of the Criminal Code in force at that time. However,
following the Court’s judgment in László Magyar v. Hungary (no. 73593/10, 20 May 2014), in which a
violation of Article 3 was found, his sentence was reviewed to include eligibility for release on parole
after 40 years of imprisonment. Mr Magyar subsequently lodged a constitutional complaint in 2015,
arguing that setting the earliest date of release once a term of 40 years had been served was
contrary to Hungary’s obligations under the Convention. The proceedings are still pending.
Relying on Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), the applicants complained that
life imprisonment with a possibility of release on parole after 40 years amounted in practice to a
whole life sentence and that they in effect still had no prospect of release. They alleged therefore
that their sentences constituted inhuman and degrading punishment and were in breach of the
Convention.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT…
Article 3
The Court dismissed the Government’s objection concerning the non-exhaustion of domestic
remedies, noting that both sets of proceedings before the Constitutional Court had been pending
since 2015, which undermined the potential effectiveness of that remedy in their cases.
It reiterated that a life sentence could be compatible with the Convention only if there was both a
prospect of release and a possibility of review from the outset. The Court had already held that
where domestic law did not provide for the possibility of such a review, a whole life sentence did not
measure up to the standards of Article 3 of the Convention.
Moreover, comparative and international-law material showed clear support for the institution of a
dedicated mechanism guaranteeing a review no later than 25 years after the imposition of a life
sentence, with further periodic reviews thereafter. It noted that the 40 years during which the
applicants would have to wait before they could expect to begin to be considered for release on
parole was significantly longer than the maximum recommended time frame. It therefore concluded
that their sentences did not, in effect, offer any real prospect of release, and were thus not
compatible with the Convention.
There had accordingly been a violation of Article 3.
Just satisfaction (Article 41)
The Court held that Hungary was to pay Mr Bancsók 3,000 euros (EUR) and Mr Magyar EUR 10,600
in respect of costs and expenses. The finding of a violation constituted in itself just satisfaction for
any non-pecuniary damage sustained.
