Disenfranchisement of mentally disabled woman was proportionate and in line with the Convention
JUDGMENT
Caamaño Valle v. Spain 11.05.2021 (app. no. 43564/17)
SUMMARY
The case concerned the disenfranchisement of the applicant’s daughter, M., who was mentally
disabled.
The Court found in particular that “ensuring that only citizens capable of assessing the consequences
of their decisions and making conscious and judicious decisions should participate in public affairs”
was a legitimate aim that had informed the domestic courts’ judgments in respect of M. It found
that the disenfranchisement decision had been individualised and proportionate to that aim. And it
found that her disenfranchisement did not thwart “the free expression of the opinion of the
people”.
The Court found that the domestic authorities had taken into account M.’s special status and had
not discriminated against her.
PROVISION
Article 14
Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol
Article 1 of the 12th Protocol
PRINCIPAL FACTS
The applicant, Maria del Mar Caamaño Valle, is a Spanish national who lives in Santiago de
Compostela (Spain). She is the mother of M., a mentally disabled woman born in 1996.
Just before M.’s 18th birthday, the applicant applied for her guardianship over her daughter to be
extended. However, she asked specifically that her daughter not be deprived of her right to vote.
Nevertheless, when the extension of her guardianship was ordered, the First-Instance Judge ordered
that M.’s right to vote be revoked, holding that she was not capable of exercising that right. The
judgment contained extensive reasoning and references to Spanish law and case-law and Spain’s
international treaty obligations. The judge and the medical expert ascertained that the limitations
imposed on M. in respect of her right to vote were based neither on the requirement of a higher
cognitive or intellectual capacity nor on M.’s lack of knowledge regarding her voting options (that is
to say her choice of candidate or party) nor on any hypothetical irrationality in respect of such
choices, but on the strict and objective establishment of her lack of capacity in respect of political
affairs and electoral matters. The restriction of her right to vote was not justified by the fact that she
hardly knew anything about the Spanish political system, but because she was highly influenceable
and not aware of the consequences of any vote that she might cast.
An appeal and an appeal on points of law by the applicant were dismissed by the Regional Court of
Corunna and the Supreme Court respectively. The applicant lodged an amparo appeal in 2016, which
was dismissed by the Constitutional Court, which stated that there were limits on suffrage, including,
among other things, judicial deprivation of the right to vote. It finally concluded that her rights had
not been breached.
Relying on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections), read alone or in conjunction with
Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 (general prohibition of
discrimination), the applicant complained that the restrictions on her daughter’s right to vote had
infringed her rights and had been discriminatory.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT…
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
Initially the Court stated that the European Convention on Human Rights was an international treaty
and the Court had to establish the ordinary meaning of terms used within it. It reiterated that the
Convention was not the sole reference for the interpretation of the rights contained within it, and so
it took into account the relevant rules and international law applicable between the States.
The Court reiterated that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 guaranteed individual rights, including the right
to vote, although the States had some limited discretion in this area. Any conditions imposed had to
be the “free expression of the people in their choice of legislature”. The presumption had to be
inclusion for all.
The Court reiterated that the aim of “ensuring that only citizens capable of assessing the
consequences of their decisions and making conscious and judicious decisions should participate in
public affairs” was legitimate. It was satisfied that that had been the aim in the decision to
disenfranchise M.
In the light of the domestic courts’ judgments at several levels of jurisdiction, the Court was also
satisfied that the authorities had balanced the interests at stake and had based their judgments on
M.’s personal lack of understanding of the meaning of a vote and her susceptibility to being
influenced. As such, her disenfranchisement had been proportionate. The Court was furthermore
satisfied that the disenfranchisement of the applicant’s daughter did not thwart the free expression
of the opinion of the people.
There had been no violation of the Convention in this regard.
Other articles
The Court noted that the difference in treatment of the applicant’s daughter and a person with the
right to vote was based on the mental capacity of each person. The restrictions took into account
her special status. The difference in her treatment was justified, and there had been no violation of
Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 or of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12.
Separate opinion
Judge Lemmens expressed a dissenting opinion, which is annexed to the judgment.
