The confession of the accused in the preliminary police investigation without being informed of his rights and without the presence of a lawyer. Violation of the right to fair trial
JUDGMENT
Lalik v. Poland 11.05.2023 (app. no. 47834/19)
SUMMARY
The case concerned the applicant’s defence rights and privilege against self-incrimination. In
January 2016, while drunk, the applicant set fire to his drinking partner’s jacket, with the latter
sustaining severe burns and dying as a result. The applicant was convicted of aggravated murder and
sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment. The judgments of the national courts referred explicitly to
statements he had made during his informal questioning which had taken place before he had seen
a lawyer and allegedly while still under the effect of alcohol.
The Court found in particular that Mr Lalik had not been properly informed of his defence rights. It
expressed concern that the national courts had admitted and assessed evidence obtained in breach
of those fundamental guarantees. The explanations that Mr Lalik had given during his informal
questioning had served as key evidence in establishing his intent to kill his friend, which in turn had
led to his conviction for murder. In the Court’s view, such reasoning went against the concept of a
fair trial.
PROVISION
Article 6 par. 3
PRINCIPAL FACTS
The applicant, Przemysław Lalik, is a Polish national who was born in 1995 and lives in Zamość
(Poland). He is currently serving a prison sentence in Zamość Prison.
In January 2016, while drunk, Mr Lalik set fire to his drinking partner’s jacket when his friend was
comatose on his basement floor. The latter sustained severe burns to 60% of his body and upper
respiratory ducts and died as a result.
Within a couple of hours, Mr Lalik was arrested and taken to the police station. A breathalyser test
showed approximately 0.65 mg/l of alcohol (1.3 per mille) in his system. According to the
Government, he was informed of his rights shortly after his arrival at the police station, although no
proof of that was submitted to the Court. The following morning, he was informally questioned by
three police officers for almost three hours without being breathalysed again and before seeing a
lawyer. No formal record of the questioning was drawn up but one of the officers made an official
note of what was said and signed it. The next day Mr Lalik was charged with murder with particular
cruelty. His defence lawyer was not present at the very start of his questioning by the prosecutor
and Mr Lalik began by pleading guilty to the charge. Once he had spoken to his lawyer a few minutes
later, he retracted what he had said and stated that he had not intended to kill his friend.
During the trial, the applicant admitted to having set fire to his friend’s jacket but explained that he
had never intended to kill him and that he had played a similar prank on him the previous August,
setting fire to a piece of his clothing without harm.
Mr Lalik was subsequently convicted of murder committed with particular cruelty and sentenced to
25 years’ imprisonment. The judgments of the national courts referred explicitly to statements he
had made during his informal questioning, retaining, amongst other things, that his friend had owed
him money. The courts considered what he had said to be particularly credible because he had
spoken spontaneously and had not had a chance to think about his line of defence.
Mr Lalik’s lawyer consistently argued that had those statements been excluded, Mr Lalik would have
faced a maximum penalty of 12 years’ imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm leading to
death. As it was, they constituted the main evidence of intent, and led to his being convicted of
murder.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT…
Article 6 § 3
The Court found that Mr Lalik had not been properly informed of his rights. It could not be sure that
at the time of his arrest Mr Lalik had been told about his right to remain silent, his right not to
incriminate himself and his right to consult a lawyer. In any event, he had not been given the information the following morning prior to being informally questioned, and his alcohol level had not been checked again. The first time he had seen a lawyer was after three hours of questioning and with a police officer present in the room.
The Court was concerned that the national courts had admitted and assessed evidence obtained in
breach of those fundamental guarantees. The contents of explanations that Mr Lalik had given
during his informal questioning had served as key evidence in establishing his intent to kill his friend,
which in turn had led to his conviction for murder. Despite the Polish Code of Criminal Procedure not
prohibiting the use of spontaneous statements made during arrest, the Court did not consider that
his statements had been spontaneous, seeing as they had been made in the presence of three police
officers during a three-hour bout of questioning. They had been recorded in an official note signed
by one of the police officers. The Court found that the use of those explanations had significantly
affected the course of the investigation and, eventually, the national courts’ findings. Although Mr
Lalik had explicitly challenged the use of those explanations before the national courts, his
arguments had been dismissed.
The Court considered that conducting a session of informal questioning after Mr Lalik’s arrest
without informing him of his rights, combined with the fact that the police officer who had written
the official note had been questioned during the trial, had put Mr Lalik at a disadvantage from the
outset of the investigation. It was concerned that the domestic courts had not only endorsed such
an approach but had also made direct reference to the applicant’s initial explanations given the
morning after the incident and considered them to be particularly credible, since – at that time – the
applicant had had “no time yet to think what would be beneficial to him and what detrimental”. In
the Court’s view, such reasoning went against the concept of a fair trial. Therefore, the Court found
that the criminal proceedings, when considered as a whole, could not be considered as fair. There
had accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention.
Observing that it was impossible to speculate as to the outcome of the proceedings had there been
no breach of the Convention, the Court noted that Article 540 § 3 of the Polish Criminal Code
provided for the possibility of reopening criminal proceedings when such a need resulted from a
decision of an international body acting on an agreement ratified by Poland.
Just satisfaction (Article 41)
The Court held that a finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just satisfaction and
rejected the applicant’s claim in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
