The ban on holding a religious event and the attack on a religious sect, violated the provisions of the ECHR
JUDGMENT
Center of Societies for Krishna Consciousness in Russia and Frolov v. Russia 23.11.221 (app. no. 37477/11)
SUMMARY
Hostile verbal attack against the Krishna movement and refusal to grant permission for public religious events promoting the teachings of Vaisnavism, a Hindu sect.
Based on Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), individually and in combination with Article 14 (non-discrimination), the applicant organization complained in particular that the pamphlet “Attention to Worship!” printed by the Ulyanovsk Region described the Krishna movement as a “total cult”, accusing it of “psychological manipulation” and “zombie” of the youth. He claimed that such descriptions violated the regional authority’s duty of neutrality and impartiality to the Krishna movement, an officially registered religious organization.
The second applicant complained about the authorities’ refusal to allow him to hold meetings, claiming that his rights under Article 9 and Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) had been violated.
The ECtHR ruled that the domestic authorities had exceeded their discretion, that these actions were not “necessary in a democratic society” and that there had therefore been a violation of Article 9 of the ECHR. According to the ECtHR, the publication in question had portrayed a strongly negative image of the new religious movements, including the Krishna movement, and had used emotionally charged and derogatory terms to describe its teachings. This suggests that the State’s duty to refrain from assessing the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs were expressed was not taken into account.
At the same time, the ECtHR considered that the restriction of the second applicant’s right was not “necessary in a democratic society”, as it was not convinced by the argument that holding a public assembly to promote Vaisnavism limited the religious beliefs of others and thus ruled that there was violation of Article 11 of the ECHR.
Based on the above judgments, the ECtHR jointly awarded the applicants EUR 7,500 for non-pecuniary damage.
PROVISIONS
Article 9
Article 11
Article 14
PRINCIPAL FACTS
The applicants are the Centre of Societies for Krishna Consciousness, a religious organisation under
Russian law based in Moscow, and a Russian national Mikhail Aleksandrovich Frolov.
The case concerns the applicants’ attempts to challenge hostile descriptions of the Krishna
movement and the refusal of permission to hold public religious events promoting the teachings of
Vaishnavism.
Relying on Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), taken alone and in conjunction
with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), the applicant organisation complains in particular that
a brochure “Watch out for cults!” produced by the Ulyanovsk Region described the Krishna
movement as a “totalitarian cult”, accusing it of “psychological manipulation” and “zombification” of
the youth. It alleges that such descriptions breached the regional authority’s duty of neutrality and
impartiality towards the Krishna movement, an officially registered religious organisation.
Mr Frolov complains that the authorities’ refusals to let him hold meetings, because promoting
Vaishnavism did not correspond to the purposes of a public event under the relevant law and was
incompatible with respect for the religious beliefs of others, breached his rights under Article 9 and
Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association).
THE DECISON OF THE COURT…
Article 9 (in respect of the applicant centre): The publication by the regional authorities had represented the applicant centre as a money‑greedy “totalitarian cult” “destructive” for Russian society and had accused it of “psychological manipulation” and “zombification” of the youth. It had been distributed to educators for further dissemination among their students and had been made available for download from the regional Government’s website. There had thus been an interference with the applicant centre’s right to freedom of religion. That interference had been “prescribed by law” and pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of public safety and the rights of others. The Court found, however, that the domestic authorities had overstepped their margin of appreciation and, therefore, that it not been “necessary in a democratic society”. In particular, there had been no indication that the regional authorities had taken into account the “need to reconcile the interests of various religious groups and to ensure that everyone’s beliefs had been respected” at any time before or during the “anti-cult” campaign. Rather it appeared that the exclusion of new or minority religious movements had been embedded in the set-up of the project from its inception. The publication had painted a starkly negative picture of new religious movements, including the Krishna movement, and had used emotionally charged and derogatory terms for describing its teachings. This did not suggest that any consideration had been given to the State’s duty to abstain from assessing the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs were expressed. Further, the allegations against the applicant centre’s beliefs had been unsubstantiated. Indeed, it was particularly striking that the regional State authorities had considered themselves at liberty of casting aspersions on the religion of the applicant centre which was an officially registered and lawfully operating religious organisation.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously)
Article 11 interpreted in the light of Article 9 (in respect of the second applicant): The Moscow authorities’ rejection of the second applicant’s notifications of a public religious event constituted an interference with his rights under Article 11, interpreted in the light of Article 9. The grounds for that rejection had, however, been unforeseeable and not “prescribed by law”. The second applicant had sent the notifications within the time-limits established by law. Nonetheless, the authorities had held that the planned event could not proceed because missionary activities – which the promotion of Vaishnavism was taken to be – were inconsistent with the purposes of a public event as defined in the Public Events Act and also incompatible with the respect for the religious beliefs of others. They did not have any objections to the planned events being held at a specific location or time, but rather to their religious nature. This amounted to content‑based restrictions on freedom of assembly which should be subjected to the most serious scrutiny by the Court.
The Public Events Act did not contain a list of permissible purposes or a requirement that a public event should pursue only permissible purposes. Nor did it specify how the purpose of the event should be assessed or provide for the authorities’ discretion in determining which purposes were permissible and which were not. It also gave a broad definition of a “public event”. The domestic courts had given no reasons whatsoever for their finding that the promotion of Vaishnavism and a healthy lifestyle fell outside the scope of that definition. They had also failed to specify the nature of the alleged incompatibility of the planned event with the concept of a “meeting” (the term that had been used by the second applicant in the notifications to describe the form of the event).
Additionally, the Court found that the restriction on the second applicant’s right had not been “necessary in a democratic society”. In this connection, the Court was not convinced by the argument that the conduct of a public assembly for the promotion of Vaishnavism had been “incompatible with the religious beliefs of others”. Further, the peaceful character of the planned religious events had not been disputed and there had been no reason to presume a risk of any disturbance of public order or breach of peace on their part. It would be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of Convention rights by a minority group were made conditional on its being accepted by the majority. It was also significant that the textually identical notifications filed in another Russian region had not been met with any objections and there had been no evidence of any disturbances during those events which appeared to have been able to proceed peacefully. This reinforced the Court’s finding that the Moscow authorities had acted in an arbitrary manner. Lastly, as to the allegation that a public event for the promotion of Vaishnavism had amounted to missionary work, it had not been shown that unlawful means of conversion, infringing the rights of others, had been or were likely to be employed by the second applicant or other participants.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously)
The Court also held, unanimously, that there was no need to examine separately the applicant centre’s complaint under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9.
Article 41: EUR 7,500 to each applicant for non-pecuniary damage.
